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Abstract 
This paper presents evidence of both counter-cyclical and secular decline in the union membership wage premiu m in 
the US and the UK over the last couple of decades.  The premium has fallen for most groups of workers, the main 
exception being public sector workers in the US.  By the beginning of the 21st Century the premium remained 
substantial in the US but there was no premium for many workers in the UK.  Industry, state and occupation-level 
analyses for the US identify upward as well as downward movement in the premium characterized by regression to 
the mean.  Using linked employer-employee data for Britain we show estimates of the membership premium tend to 
be upwardly biased where rich employer data are absent and that OLS estimates are higher than those obtained with 
propensity score matching.   
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Introduction 
 
The decline in union density in the United States and the United Kingdom has prompted some 
commentators to wonder whether unions matter anymore.  In particular, there has been 
speculation that the intensif ication of competition since the 1980s, coupled with a diminution of 
union bargaining strength, has prevented unions from obtaining the sort of wage premium they 
achieved in the past.  It is evident that unions are not as central to the economy as they used to 
be, but union decline is not apparent everywhere:  many employers continue to contend with 
strong unions, raising important questions about union effects in those sectors.   
This paper estimates trends in the union wage premium over the last few decades in the 
UK and the US.  We identify both counter-cyclical and secular decline in the union membership 
wage premium in the US and the UK over the last couple of decades.  The premium has fallen 
for most groups of workers, the main exception being public sector workers in the US.  By the 
beginning of the 21st Century the premium remained substantial in the US but there was no 
premium for many workers in the UK.  Industry, state and occupation-level analyses for the US 
identify upward as well as downward movement in the premium characterized by regression to 
the mean.  We also indicate the need for some caution in interpreting the magnitude of the 
premium estimated using standard OLS techniques.  Using linked employer-employee data for 
Britain, we show estimates of the membership premium tend to be upwardly biased where rich 
employer data are absent and that OLS estimates are higher than those obtained with propensity 
score matching. 
 
 
1.  Background 
 
In his definitive empirical work H. Gregg Lewis (1986) found that the overall impact of unions 
in the US economy was approximately 15 per cent and showed relatively little variation across 
years – varying between 12 per cent and 19 per cent between 1967 and 1979.  Subsequent work 
confirmed constancy of the differential until the 1990s.  For example, Hirsch and his co-authors 
have produced a series of papers estimating changes in the differential over time and concluded 
there has been some decline in the premium in recent years (e.g. Hirsch et al, 2002; Hirsch and 
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Schumacher, 2002; Hirsch and Macpherson, 2002).  Bratsberg and Ragan (2002) come to similar 
conclusions in their examination of private sector union wage differentials.  They also conclude 
that dispersion in the wage premium across industries has substantia lly declined as the US 
economy has become more competitive.    
Counter-cyclical movement in the union wage premium may occur when unions can 
protect their members from downward wage pressures workers in general face when market 
conditions are unfavorable (Freeman and Medoff, 1984).  Conversely, when demand for labor is 
strong, employees rely less on unions to bargain for better wages because market rates rise 
anyway.  A second factor that might induce counter-cyclical movement in the premium is the 
length of union contracts relative to non-union ones, which means union wages are less 
responsive to the cycle .  However, if the union premium comes from employers sharing rents, it 
is plausible that the premium will be higher when those rents are higher, in which case the wage 
gap would be pro-cyclical.  Empirical evidence suggests pro-cyclical movement in union wages 
in the 1970s (Moore and Raisian, 1980; Grant, 2001), disappeared in the 1980s (Grant, 2001; 
Wunnava and Okunade, 1996).  Taking a longer-time frame through to 1999, Bratsberg and 
Ragan (2002) find clear evidence of a counter-cyclical union wage premium. 
A factor that should reduce the cyclical sensitivity of the union wage premium is the cost-
of-living-adjustment (COLA) clauses in union contracts that increase union wages in response to 
increases in the consumer price level.  According to Freeman and Medoff (1984:  54), despite a 
dramatic rise in COLA coverage in the 1970s, their wage estimates for manufacturing suggest 
that COLA provisions “contributed only a modest amount to the rising union advantage” in the 
1970s.  Bratsberg and Ragan (2002) revisit this issue and find an increased sensitivity of the 
premium to the cycle that they attribute, in part, to reduced COLA coverage from the late 1980s.   
The recent spate of studies that have looked at the impact of union membership on wages 
in the UK has been occasioned by a growing belief that the union wage premium may be falling.  
Some argue that a decline in the average union premium is consistent with diminishing union 
influence over pay setting.  There is certainly evidence pointing in that direction.  First, case 
studies suggest the scope of bargaining has narrowed substantially in companies that continue to 
bargain with unions (Brown et al, 1998).  Second, pay settlements in the private sector by the end 
of the 1990s were no greater where trade unions were involved than in their absence (Forth and 
Millward, 2000a).  Third, even where managers say employees have their pay set through 
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workplace-level or organization-level collective bargaining, union representatives and officials 
are either not involved or are only consulted in a minority of cases (Millward et al, 2001).  But 
there is also evidence to the contrary.  For example, unions continue to have a substantial effect 
on pay structures, bringing up the wages of the lowest paid and thus narrowing pay differentials 
across gender, ethnicity, health and occupation (Metcalf et al, 2001).  These studies, which 
indicate union effects despite substantial declines in union density, might suggest that those 
unions that have survived are the stronger and, as such, better able to command a wage premium 
(thus raising the “batting average” of unions).   
The consensus in the earlier literature is that the mean union wage gap was approximately 
10 per cent (Blanchflower, 1999).  Despite the rapid decline in union density experienced in the 
UK since 1979, the gap remained roughly constant from 1970 – the year for which the earliest 
estimate is available (Shah, 1984) – to 1995 (see Blanchflower, 1999).1  However, while the 
union effect was persisting, the premium declined for some workers (Blanchflower, 1999; 
Hildreth, 1999).  Hildreth (1999:  7) argues that stability in the union premium for blue-collar 
male workers in 1991-95 compared with a declining premium for their white-collar counterparts 
may reflect their respective abilities to maintain their bargaining power.  The picture emerging 
from research through to 1998/99 is suggestive of a more widespread decline in the premium.  
Machin’s (2001) analysis of longitudinal data from the British Household Panel Survey indicates 
that, although there was a wage gain for people moving into union jobs in the early 1990s, this 
had disappeared by the late 1990s.  Booth and Bryan (2004) using linked employer-employee 
data for 1998 also find no significant wage premium.  Forth and Millward (2002b) find the 
premium was confined to workers in workplaces with high bargaining coverage or multiple 
unions. 
On the basis of this evidence for the UK, it is difficult to establish what has happened to 
the trend in the premium over time because, as others note (Andrews et al, 1998; Lanot and 
Walker, 1998:  343) there have been no studies estimating the premium over the 1980s and 
1990s with a consistent methodology and comparable data. 
 
                                                
1 However, there is some dispute on this question.  Establishment-level analyses indicate that the union wage 
premium in the early 1980s was most evident where unions were strong, as indicated by the presence of a closed 
shop (Stewart, 1987).  This premium seems to have declined in the second half of the 1980s, a trend which has been 
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2.  Trends in the Union Wage Premium in the United States 
 
Table 1 presents estimates of the wage gap using separate log hourly earnings equations for each 
of the years from 1973 to 1981 using the National Bureau of Economic Research’s (NBER) May 
Earnings Supplements to the Current Population Survey (CPS) and for the years since then using 
data from the NBER’s Matched Outgoing Rotation Group (MORG) files of the CPS.2  For both 
the May and the MORG files a broadly similar, but not identical, list of control variables is used, 
including a union status dummy, age and its square, a gender dummy, education, race and hours 
controls plus state and industry dummies. 
The first column of Table 1 reports time-consistent estimates of the union wage premium 
for the union coefficient in log hourly earnings equations for the total sample whereas the second 
and third columns report them for the private sector.  Results obtained by Hirsch and 
Schumacher (2002) with a somewhat different set of controls are reported in the final column of 
the table.3  The time series properties of all three of the series are essentially the same. 
The wage gap averages between 17 and 18 percent over the period, and is similar in size 
in the private sector as it is in the economy as a whole.  What is notable is the high differential in 
the early-to-mid 1980s and a slight decline thereafter, which gathers pace after 1995, with the 
series picking up again as the economy started to turn down in 2000.   
Figure 1 plots the point estimates of the US whole economy and private sector union 
wage premia, taken from the first and second columns of Table 1, against unemployment for 
1973-2002.  The premium moves counter-cyclically. 
 
The US private sector union wage premium by worker type  
 
Table 2 presents union wage gaps obtained from estimating a series of equations for sub-groups 
of private sector employees since the mid-1970s.  To ensure large sample sizes we pooled 
together six successive May CPS files from 1974-1979 and compare those to wage gaps 
                                                                                                                                                        
attributed to a decline in the incidence and impact of the closed shop, coupled with unions’ inability to establish 
differentials in new workplaces (Stewart, 1995).   
2 Table 1 is taken from Blanchflower and Bryson (2003a) which also contains full details of problems regarding data 
imputation in CPS.  The May extracts of the CPS extracts in Stata format from 1969 -1987 are available from the 
NBER at http://www.nber.org/data/cps_may.html.  There was no CPS survey with wages and union s tatus in 1982. 
3 For a discussion of the reason for these differences, see Blanchflower and Bryson (2003a). 
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estimated for the years 1996-2001 using data from the Matched Outgoing Rotation Group 
(MORG) files of the CPS.  Two points stand out from these analyses.  First, no group of workers 
in the private sector sample has experienced a substantial increase in their union premium.  
Clearly, unions have found it harder to maintain a wage gap over time.  Second, with the 
exception of the manual/nonmanual gap, those with the highest premiums in the 1970s saw the 
biggest falls, so there has been some convergence in the wage gaps.  Nevertheless, with the 
exception of the most highly educated and non-manual workers, the wage premium remains 
around 10 percent or more. 
 
The US public sector union wage premium by worker type 
 
By 2001, public sector unions accounted for 44 percent of all union members in the US 
compared with 32.5 percent in 1983. 
Table 3 is comparable to Table 2 for the private sector in that it presents disaggregated 
union wage gap estimates but, due to data constraints, the base period is from the early 1980s.  
Because sample sizes in the public sector are small using the May CPS files we use data from the 
ORG files of the CPS for the years 1983-1988 for comparison purposes with the 1996-2001 
data.4  The private sector union wage gap has fallen over the two periods (21.5 percent to 17.0 
percent) whereas a slight increase was observed in the public sector (13.3 percent to 14.5 
percent, respectively).  Furthermore, the majority of the worker groups in the public sector 
experienced increases in their union wage premium over the period. 
 
Industry, occupation and state-level wage premia5 
 
The conventional assumption is that unions can procure a wage premium by capturing quasi-
rents from the employer (Blanchflower et al, 1996).  If this is so, there must be rents available to 
the firm arising from its position in the market place, and unions must have the ability to capture 
some of these rents through their ability to monopolize the firm’s labor supply.  Individual-level 
                                                
4 Data for the years 1979-1982 could not be used, as no union data are available.  A further advantage of the 1983-
1988 data is that information is available on individuals whose earnings were allocated who were then excluded 
from the analysis. 
5 See Blanchflower and Bryson (2004) for full details on the estimations used in this section. 
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data can tell us little about these processes.  Instead, the literature has concentrated on industry-
level wage gaps.  In this section we model the change in the union wage premium at three 
different units of observation:  industry, state, and occupation. 
 
Industries 
 
We used our data to estimate separate results for 44 two digit industries for 1983-1988 and 1996-
2001. 6 In contrast to the analysis by worker characteristics, which reveal near universal decline 
in the premium – at least in the private sector – we found that the wage gap rose in 17 industries 
and declined in 27.  The decline in the wage gap for the whole economy, presented earlier, is due 
to the fact that the industries experiencing a decline in their wage gap make up a higher 
percentage of all employees than those experiencing a widening gap.  The results are similar to 
those presented by Bratsberg and Ragan (2002) who found that, over the period 1971-1999, the 
regression-adjusted wage gap closed in 16 industries and increased in 16 others. 
 The gap rose by more than ten percentage points in autos (+12 percent) and leather (+19 
percent).  It declined by more than twenty percentage points in other agriculture (-33 percent) 
retail trade (-20 percent) and private households (-29 percent).  Many of the industries 
experiencing a fall in the union premium between 1983 and 2001 would have been subject to 
intensifying international trade (such as textiles, apparel and furniture) but this was equally true 
for those experiencing rising premiums (such as machinery, electrical equipment, paper, rubber 
and plastics, leather). 
Some of the biggest declines in the premium have been concentrated in the three 
industries with more than a 10 percent share in private sector union membership in 2002.  In 
construction and transport, which both make up an increasing proportion of all private sector 
union members, the premium fell by around 10 percentage points.  In retail trade, where the 
share of private sector union membership has remained roughly constant at 10 percent, the 
premium fell 20 percentage points.   
To explore these changes in the private sector industry union wage premium over time 
we ran panel fixed effects estimates.  Our first step was to estimate separate first-stage 
regressions for each of our industries in each year from 1983-2001 with the dependent variable 
                                                
6 We chose these years as it was possible to define industries identically using the 1980 industry classification. 
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the log hourly wage along with controls for union membership, age, age squared, male, 4 race 
dummies, the log of hours, and 50 state dummies.  Three sectors with very small sample sizes 
(toys, tobacco, and forestry and fisheries) were deleted.  We extracted the coefficient on the 
union variable, giving us 19 years * 42 industries or 798 observations in all.  The coefficient on 
the union variable was then turned into a wage gap taking anti-logs, deducting 1 and multiplying 
by 100 to turn the figure into a percentage.  We used the ORG files to estimate the proportion of 
workers in the industry who were union members  both in the private sector and overall and 
mapped that onto the file.  Unemployment rates at the level of the economy are used as industry-
specific rates are not meaningful:  workers move a great deal between industries and 
considerably more than they do between states.   
Regression results, reported in columns 1 and 2 of Table 4, estimate the impact of the 
lagged premium, lagged unemployment, and a time trend on the level of the industry-level wage 
premium.  The number of observations is 756 as we lose 42 observations in generating the lag on 
the wage premium and the union density variables.   
In the unweighted equation in column (1) the lagged premium is positively and 
significantly associated with the level of the premium the following year indicating regression to 
the mean.  Unemployment and the time trend are not significant.  However, once the regression 
is weighted by the number of observations in the industry in the first-stage regression, (column 
(2)) lagged unemployment is positive and significant, indicating counter-cyclical movement in 
the premium, while the negative time trend indicates secular decline in the premium. 
Bratsberg and Ragan (2002) reported that the industry-level premium was influenced by a 
number of other variables.7  In particular they found that COLA clauses reduced the cyclicality 
of the union premium and that increases in import penetration were strongly associated with 
rising union premiums.  They also found some evidence that industry deregulation had mixed 
effects.  Their main equations (their Table 2) did not include a lagged dependent variable.  Table 
5 reports results using their data for the years 1973-1999 using their method and computer 
programs that they kindly provided to us.  Column 1 of Table 5 reports the results they reported 
                                                
7  Bratsberg and Ragan (2002) also use CPS data.  But their analysis differs in several ways.  First, they assess trends 
over the period 1971 -1999 whereas we present trends over the period 1983-2001.  Second, we adjust for wage 
imputation as recommended by Hirsch and Schumacher (2002) whereas Bratsberg and Ragan do not.  Third, 
specifications producing the regression-adjusted estimates differ somewhat.  Fourth, the samples differ.  In 
particular, Bratsberg and Ragan exclude government workers, and they present results for some different industries.  
Fifth, their wage premium relates to weekly wages whereas all of our estimates are derived from (log) hourly wages. 
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in column 2 of their Table 2.  Column 2 reports our attempt to replicate their findings.  We are 
unable to do so exactly but there are several similarities – we find import penetration both in 
durables and nondurables, COLA clauses, deregulations in communications, and the 
unemployment rate all have positive and significant effects.  We also found, as they did, that 
deregulation in finance lowered the premium.  In contrast to Bratsberg and Ragan, however, the 
inflation rate and the two interaction terms with the unemployment rate were insignificant.  The 
model is rerun in column 3, but without the insignificant interaction term.  A linear time trend is 
added in column 4:  this is negative and significant, and eliminates the COLA effect and the 
negative effect of deregulation in the finance sector.  Column 5 adds the lagged union wage 
premium, which is positive and significant.  Its introduction makes inflation positive and 
significant.  In columns (6) to (8) models are run without the four insignificant deregulation 
dummies.  Column (6) indicates that using an unweighted regression, the size of the lagged 
premium effect drops markedly and the time trend and inflation lose significance, showing these 
results are sensitive to the weighting of the regression.  The smaller coefficient on the lagged 
dependent variable is unsurprising given that there is much less likely to be variation in the union 
wage gap estimates in industries with large sample sizes that have higher weights in the former 
case.  We are able to confirm Bratsberg and Ragan’s finding that the unemployment rate, 
deregulation in communications, and import penetration in both durables and nondurables have 
positive impacts on the premium but not the findings on COLA, inflation, or any of the other 
deregulations identified.   
That import penetration in durable and nondurable goods sectors increases the premium 
suggests that union wages are more resilient than nonunion wages to foreign competition.  
Import penetration is likely correlated with unmeasured industry characteristics that depress the 
premium inducing a negative bias that is removed once industry characteristics are controlled 
for.  Import penetration has likely reduced demand for union and nonunion labor, with union 
wages holding up better than nonunion wages, but at the expense of reduced union employment.  
There are theoretical and empirical reasons as to why this might occur.  For instance, since union 
wages tend to be less responsive to market conditions generally, union wages may be sluggish in 
responding to increased import competition.  Alternatively, industries characterized by “end-
game” bargaining may witness perverse union responses to shifts in product demand as the union 
tries to extract maximum rents in declining industries (Lawrence and Lawrence, 1985).  Another 
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possibility is that increased import penetration reduces the share of union employment in labor -
intensive firms and increasing it in capital-intensive firms.  Greater capital intensity reduces 
elasticity of demand for union labor, allowing rent maximizing unions to raise the premium 
(Staiger, 1988). 
It is not obvious that weights should be used if we regard each industry as a separate 
observation.  Columns (1) to (6) are GLS estimates accounting for potential correlation in error 
terms.  Column (7) switches to a weighted OLS and shows that results are not sensitive to the 
switch.  The unweighted OLS in column (8) gives broadly the same results as the unweighted 
GLS in column (6).  Taking off the weights has a much bigger effect than switching from GLS to 
OLS.   
Furthermore, the industries defined by Bratsberg and Ragan are very different in size.  
Some industries are very broadly defined – for example industry 32 Services covers SIC codes 
721-900 whereas tobacco covers one SIC code (#130).  Retail trade averaged 19,075 
observations.  Column 9 of Table 5 illustrates the sensitivity of the results to industry exclusions.  
It is exactly equivalent in all respects to column 5 of Table 5 except that it drops the 32 
observations from retail trade.  The lagged dependent variable falls dramatically from .60 to .32.  
The COLA variable is now significantly positive while the inflation variable moves from being 
significantly positive to insignificant.  The unweighted results (not reported) are little changed.  
Bratsberg and Ragan’s results appear to be sensitive to both the use of weights and the sample of 
industries used. 
 
States 
 
A similar procedure was adopted to estimate state-level premia over time for the 50 states plus 
Washington D.C.  We compare results using merged samples of the CPS’s MORG for 1983-
1988 and 1996-2001 files.8 The mean state union wage gap was 23.4 percent between 1983 and 
1988, falling to 17.2 percent in 1996-2001.  The premium fell in all but five states.  The premium 
                                                
8 The source of the data is the Union Members hip and Coverage Database which is an Internet data resource 
providing private and public sector union membership, coverage, and density estimates compiled from the Current 
Population Survey (CPS) using BLS methods.  Economy -wide estimates are provided beginning in 1973; estimates 
by state, detailed industry, and detailed occupation begin in 1983; and estimates by metropolitan area begin in 1986.  
The Database, constructed by Barry Hirsch (Trinity University) and David Macpherson (Florida State University),  
is updated annually.  The Database can be accessed at http://www.unionstats.com.   
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only rose markedly in Maine, where it increased 9 percentage points (from 7 percent to 16.1 
percent).  We then ran 969 separate first-stage regressions, one for each state in each year from 
1983-2001 with the dependent variable the log hourly wage along with controls for union 
membership, age, age squared, male, 4 race dummies, the log of hours, and 44 industry 
dummies.  The sample was restricted to the private sector.  We extracted the coefficient on the 
union variable, giving us 19 years * 51 states (including D.C.), 969 observations in all.  We then 
mapped to that file the unemployment rate in the state-year cell. 9 Once again we ran a series of 
second-stage regressions where the dependent variable is the one -year level of the premium 
(obtained by taking anti-logs of the union coefficient and deducting one) on a series of RHS 
variables including the lagged premium and lagged unemployment and union density rates.10 
Results are reported in columns (3) and (4) of Table 4.  The number of observations is 918 - we 
lose 51 observations in generating the lag on the wage premium and the union density variables.  
Both unweighted and weighted results are presented where the weights are total employment in 
the state by year.  Controlling for state fixed effects with 50 state dummies we find that with an 
unweighted regression (column (3)), the lagged premium is positive and significant, as it was at 
industry level.  Again, as in the case of industry-level analysis, the effect is apparent when 
weighting the regression (column (4)).  The positive, significant effect of lagged state-level 
unemployment confirms the counter -cyclical nature of the premium - the effect is apparent 
whether the regression is weighted or not.  There is also evidence of a secular decline in the 
state-level premium, but only where the regression is unweighted.11 
 
Occupations  
 
Finally, we moved on to estimate wage gaps at the level of the occupation pooling six years of 
data for each of the time periods 1983-1988 and 1996-2001.  In each case we used files from the 
Outgoing Rotation Group files of the CPS.  Out of the 44 groups, 13 showed increases in the size 
of the differential over time while the remainder had decreases.  We used the same method 
described above for industries and states, with occupations defined in a comparable way through 
                                                
9 Source:  http://data.bls.gov/labjava/outside.jsp?survey=la. 
10 We experimented with both the level of the unemployment rate and the log and the latter always worked best.   
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time.  Columns (5) and (6) of Table 4 show that whether the occupation-level analysis is 
weighted or not, there is clear evidence of regression to the mean, with the lagged premium 
positive and significant, as well as evidence of a secular decline in the premium.  A significant 
counter-cyclical effect is evident when the regression is weighted, but not in the unweighted 
regression. 
In all three units of observation– industry, state, and occupation – there is evidence that 
the private sector premium moves counter-cyclically and that it has been declining over time.  In 
all three cases the lagged level of the premium entered significantly positively and was larger 
when the weights were used than when they were not.  The size of the lag was greatest when 
industries were used as the unit of observation and least when occupations were used.  
Translating the results from levels into changes – that is by deducting t-1 from both sides – 
leaves all of the other coefficients unchanged.  Using the weighted results in Table 4 the results 
reported below imply mean convergence.  
 
State level ?Premium t  - t-1 = -.7949Premiumt -1 
Industry level ?Premium t  - t-1 = -.6457Premiumt -1 
Occupation level ?Premium t  - t-1 = -.8254Premiumt -1 
 
The higher the level of the premium in the previous period the lower the change in the next 
period. 
 
 
3.  Trends in the Union Wage Premium in the United Kingdom 
 
Table 6 presents the union membership wage premium over the period 1985-2002.  Column 1 
estimates the premium for the UK since 1993 using the Labour Force Survey (LFS), while 
column 2 estimates it for Britain since 1985 using the British Social Attitudes Surveys (BSAS).  
Both series are based on standard specifications for each separate year (details are contained in 
the Data Appendix available on request).  In identifying the union effect over time, we make 
                                                                                                                                                        
11 State fixed effects account for state-level variance in union density where the effect is fixed over time.  However, 
Farber (2003) argues that there remain potential unobserved variables which simultaneously determine density and 
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what we think is the reasonable assumption that any bias in our estimates arising through 
unobserved heterogeneity is constant over time. 
The LFS estimates tend to be above the BSAS estimates, but in both series there has been 
a decline in the log hourly union wage premium since 1994 (with the BSAS estimate for 1997 
being an outlier, perhaps due to the much smaller sample that year).12  Although the premium 
remains roughly 10 per cent in the 2000 LFS, it falls to a statistically insignificant 5 per cent in 
BSAS 2000, and falls even further in 2001.  However, it recovers to a statistically significant 
6.4% in 2002 as unemployment rises, further evidence of counter-cyclical movement in the 
premium which is brought out more clearly in Figure 2. 
 
Trends by worker type  
 
In analyses not presented here we find a large fall in the wage premium across most types of 
worker, indicated by the sub-group regressions (see Blanchflower and Bryson, 2003a for details).  
In 1993, analyses of LFS indicate only one group of employees (the highly educated) had a 
premium well below 10 per cent.  In 2000, all but three out of the 17 types of worker had a 
premium below 10 per cent.  Those worse affected were manufacturing workers, men, private 
sector workers and non-whites, all of whom had no significant premium by 2000.  Results are 
similar when using BSAS data.  In 1993-95, only two types of worker (non-manuals and the 
highly qualified) had a union premium of less than 10 per cent.  By 1999-2001, eleven types of 
worker had a premium of less than 10 per cent.  For five types of worker (men, younger workers, 
those in the private sector, non-manuals, and the highly educated) the membership premium was 
no longer statistically significant. 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
wages, but which are time-varying, and thus not picked up in fixed effects, which might bias our results. 
12 The estimate for 1997 is smaller (13%) when the data are weighted.  Further support for the proposition that the 
BSAS 1997 point estimate is an outlier comes from the authors’ calculations of the log hourly wage premium using 
the same methodology (unweighted estimates of the mid-point earnings) for individual level data from the 
Workplace Employee Relations Survey 1998, the fieldwork for which spanned 1997 and 1998.  The raw 
membership premium is .226 (25.4%).  This shifts with the addition of controls as follows:  + demographics = .121; 
+ job = .114; + establishment = .076; + geographical = .091.  In short, these estimates point to a premium of around 
10% in 1997/98.   
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4.  The Impact of Data Richness and Estimation Method on the Magnitude of the Union 
Membership Wage Premium 
 
Our knowledge of the size of the union membership wage premium in the US and the UK 
derives largely from analyses of individual and household survey data.  There will be an upward 
bias in these estimates, induced by the paucity of employer controls in such data, if unionized 
employers are better payers than non-unionized employers.  This deficiency in employer controls 
is addressed directly in this section with linked employer-employee data from the Workplace 
Employee Relations Survey 1998 (WERS).  As well as information on individual employees’ 
union membership, WERS contains rich information on the employer, including workplace-level 
union density and pay bargaining arrangements for  occupations within the workplace.  The 
regression coefficient for the union membership dummy in an OLS can be interpreted as the 
causal effect of union membership on wages if the variables entering the regression equation 
account fully for endogenous selection into membership status.  This requires very informative 
data.  We assess the sensitivity of results to this assumption by varying the information set 
entering the estimation – first utilizing individual-level data only, and then introducing 
workplace-level data.   
An alternative to OLS to control for bias on observables is the semi-parametric statistical 
matching approach known as propensity score matching (PSM) (Rosenbaum and Rubin, 1983; 
Heckman et al, 1999) which compares wage outcomes for unionized workers with ‘matched’ 
non-unionized workers.  The method shares the causal identification assumption of the OLS in 
that it yields unbiased estimates of the treatment impact where differences between individuals 
affecting the outcome of interest are captured in their observed attributes (the conditional 
independence assumption, or CIA).13  However, matching has three distinct advantages relative 
to regression in identifying an unbiased causal impact of membership on wages.  First, it is semi-
parametric, so it does not require the assumption of linearity in the outcome equation.  Second, it 
leaves the individual causal effect completely unrestricted so heterogeneous treatment effects are 
allowed for and no assumption of constant additive treatment effects for different individuals is 
required.  Thirdly, matching estimators highlight the problem of common support and thus the 
short-comings of parametric techniques which involve extrapolating outside the common support 
                                                
13 For a full description of the PSM technique and its application in this case see Bryson (2002). 
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(Heckman, et al, 1998).  The appropriateness of the CIA is dependent on having data that 
account for selection into membership.  As in the case of the OLS estimates, the sensitivity of 
results to data quality is assessed by altering the information set entering estimation. 
Table 7 reports OLS estimates of the union membership wage premium in the private 
sector as a whole and for coverage, gender and occupational sub-groups.  Using individual-level 
data only, the estimated membership premium for the whole private sector is 15% (the 
exponentiated coefficient for union member in column 1).  Column 2 introduces data collected 
from the employer.  The employer variables are jointly significant and improve the model fit.  
What is more, they reduce the membership premium by over half to 6.1%.  This pattern, whereby 
the premium estimated using individual-level only data is substantially reduced with the 
introduction of workplace-level data, is repeated across the sub-group analyses.  The impact of 
workplace-level data is particularly marked for men and manual workers.  These findings 
suggest that, at least in the British case, OLS estimates of the membership premium based on 
individual-level and household survey data are upwardly biased because some of the positive 
wage effect attributed to membership is actually due to members being employed at better 
paying workplaces.  There are many possible reasons why union workplaces might be better 
payers than non-union workplaces.  Unions may target organizing efforts on employers with the 
biggest rents to share.  ‘Better’ employers may chose to unionize to create stable firm-employer 
conditions conducive to investment in human capital.  Alternatively, if union members are 
‘better’ workers than their non-member counterparts in ways unobservable to the analyst but 
observable to employers, members may be able to sort themselves into the best employers, or 
may be chosen by the best employers (Abowd et al, 1999).   
These analyses for the whole private sector condition on whether the individual is located 
in a workplace where the employer engages with a union in pay bargaining, as well as on union 
density at the workplace where the employee works.14  However, if the biggest component of 
any membership premium is that generated by collective bargaining, the premium should be 
much smaller where the sub-sample consists solely of workers in covered occupations.  In 
general, all these workers should benefit from pay bargaining, unless employers discriminate 
                                                
14 The full union-nonunion wage differential combining membership and coverage is obtained by exponentiating the 
sum of the membership and workplace-level union recognition coefficients exp(.059 + -.018) = 4.2%.  The union 
recognition dummy is never statistically significant in the equations presented in Table 7, but wages rise with union 
density.  
  15 
between members and non-members.  In fact, the OLS estimates for covered occupations 
presented in row 2 differ little from those for the whole private sector .  Again, the size of the 
premium falls substantially once account is taken of workplace heterogeneity, but it remains 
sizeable and statistically significant at 6.7%.  On this evidence, the membership premium among 
covered workers, evident in other recent studies using individual-level data only (for the US, 
Schumacher, 1999, Budd and Na, 2000; and for Britain, Hildreth, 2000), persists having 
accounted for workplace heterogeneity.   
Intriguingly, the 14% of employees who are members in uncovered occupations receive a 
similar membership premium of 5.7% when the OLS is run with individual and workplace-level 
controls.  However, almost three-quarters (71%) of these members are located in workplaces 
where other workers have their pay set through collective bargaining.  This suggests that these 
members benefit from the spillover effects of collective bargaining at their workplace.15 
The most striking evidence that union membership effects are heterogeneous comes from 
analyses by broad occupation.  Running analyses for manual and non-manual employees 
separately, results confirm those from other studies in showing a larger membership premium 
among manual workers (Booth, 1995; Forth and Millward, 2002b).  Indeed, with the introduction 
of workplace controls, non-manual workers are the only group of workers for whom the OLS 
estimates do not produce a statistically significant membership premium. 
Table 8 presents the PSM analyses.  These are run on identical samples to those used in 
the OLS estimates in Table 7.  The sample sizes are smaller than those appearing in Table 7 
because, in the process of matching members to their nearest neighbors, PSM leaves many non-
members out of the estimation sample (the Data Appendix, available on request, contains 
details).  In addition, a small number of members have no support in the non-member population, 
so it is not possible to estimate membership effects for this subset.  Fortunately this group tends 
to be small, ranging between 3%-6% in most cases.  This means common support is not a 
problem, so PSM can estimate the effect of membership on members for nearly all of the 
member population.  As in the case of the OLS estimates in Table 7, PSM estimates are run with 
individual controls only, and with individual plus workplace controls. 
The results are striking.  The first row in column 1 shows the membership premium based 
on matching with individual data alone is estimated to be 8.9%.  When workplace data are used 
                                                
15 Forth and Millward (2002b) find evidence of such spillover effects in their analysis of WERS.   
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in the matching this premium disappears and is even negatively signed.  As in the case of the 
OLS estimates in Table 7, the introduction of workplace -level data always reduces the 
membership premium, confirming the potential for upward bias in estimates based on individual-
level data – whether estimated via OLS or PSM.  But, in stark contrast to the OLS estimates in 
Table 7, there is no significant membership premium for any type of employee where matching 
is based on individual and workplace-leve l data.  The premia are always statistically significant 
if one runs OLS on the matched data (see Data Appendix for details), so one can discount sample 
size differences and common support enforcement as reasons for differences in the OLS and 
PSM results.  Rather, the OLS estimates are upwardly biased due to the linear functional form 
assumption.  Of course, it is arguable that the OLS models are simply misspecified and that 
results could be reconciled through the addition of appropriate interaction terms.  In practice, this 
requires a great deal of trial and effort and, in any event, OLS will still be linear, albeit in non-
linear covariates.  This is illustrated by the fact that the OLS-generated premium remains large 
and significant across coverage, gender and broad occupation, three dimensions where one is 
most likely to find heterogeneous membership effects.  Yet, in each case, the PSM-generated 
premia are not significant.  In estimates not shown, the membership premium for uncovered 
workers where matching is based on individual and workplace-level data is –2.4%.  It is true 
that, at 6.9%, the PSM estimate of the premium for manual workers comes close to statistical 
significance (with the bootstrapped 95% confidence interval presented in the Data Appendix 
only just straying into negative territory).  So, if there was a membership premium for anyone in 
Britain in 1998, it was for manual workers. 
Table 9 presents four sensitivity analyses.  The first row reproduces results from Tables 7 
and 8 for the ‘baseline’ estimates.  The first two sensitivity analyses involve alterations to the X 
vector used in the OLS estimation and estimation of the propensity score.  The third sensitivity 
analysis estimates effects on weekly wages, as opposed to hourly wages.  The fourth involves 
splitting the analyses according to union strength at the workplace employing the worker.  In 
each case, the first column presents results from the OLS using individual-level and workplace-
level controls.  The second column presents the PSM results, and the third column presents the 
OLS results run on the matched data. 
Although there is a sizeable union wage premium literature conditioning on bargaining 
coverage and union density, it is at least arguable that density and union recognition are 
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endogenous with respect to membership in that these workplace features are, in part, a function 
of individuals’ decisions to unionize.  A comparison of results in row 2 Table 9 with the whole 
private sector estimates in row 1 shows the premium estimates rise in the absence of density and 
recognition controls.  However, the pattern of results remains the same, with OLS producing 
sizeable and statistically significant premia, whereas the PSM estimate is small and statistically 
non-significant. 
Workplace training and workplace tenure may also be endogenous with respect to 
membership, which is why they were omitted from the earlier estimates.  Their inclusion in row 
3 of Table 9 makes no difference at all to the PSM estimates, and very little difference to the 
OLS using matched data.  The premium estimated with OLS on unmatched data falls a little.   
There is the potential for measurement error in the hourly earnings measure and estimates 
of the wage premium can differ across hourly and weekly earnings measures due to different 
working patterns of members and non-members.  Row 4 in Table 9 therefore shows the 
sensitivity of results to the use of a weekly earnings measure.  Again, the pattern of results is 
largely unchanged. 
Empirical evidence for Britain (Stewart, 1987) and the United States (Schumacher, 1999) 
indicates that the union premium is higher where union density is higher.  This may be because a 
higher incidence of ‘free-riding’ can weaken union bargaining strength, or else causation may 
work the other way if the incentive to join a union is higher where the union commands a larger 
premium.  Splitting the analysis into employees working in lower and higher density workplaces 
offers some support for the proposition that the membership premium is higher where the union 
is stronger.  Using OLS to estimate the membership effect on unmatched data, the premium is 
much larger among employees in workplaces with 50%+ density than it is among those located 
in workplaces with less than 50% density.  There is also a dif ferential using PSM although the 
premium is not significant in either case. 
Across all these sensitivity analyses, OLS identifies a sizeable and statistically significant 
membership premium whereas PSM finds no significant premium, supporting the main 
conclusion from the baseline analyses.  In the case of OLS and PSM, the introduction of rich 
employer controls substantially reduces the size of the membership premium, sometimes 
rendering it statistically non-significant.  Using the same data set Booth and Bryan (2004) came 
to a similar conclusion having controlled for workplace fixed effects.  The two studies confirm 
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the importance of controlling for workplace heterogeneity in accurately estimating the union 
membership wage premium. 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
The union membership wage premium has been higher in the US than the UK in the last couple 
of decades.  In both countries the premium was untrended in the years up to the mid-1990s, but it 
has fallen since then.  Much of this is due to counter-cyclical movement and thus, as we might 
expect, the premium rose with unemployment in both countries in 2001 and 2002 after a number 
of years of decline.  However, we also find clear evidence in the US of a secular decline in the 
premium.  Even so, in 2002, the premium in the US economy was 16.5%, just a little below the 
17.1% average for the period 1973-2002.  In the private sector it was 1 percentage point above 
the average of 17.6% for the period.  In the UK, on the other hand, there are real questions as to 
whether there is a significant union wage premium for workers at the beginning of the 21st 
Century.  Standard OLS estimates of the premium show no statistically significant premium for 
many types of worker.  The analyses for 1998 using linked employer-employee data suggest that 
LFS and BSAS estimates of the premium in the UK may even overstate the size of the premium, 
as do the analyses using PSM instead of OLS. 
In the US and the UK the premium has fallen for virtually all types of private sector 
employee, with those with the largest premiums at the outset suffering the greatest declines.  
These include more vulnerable workers such as the lower educated and women, raising questions 
about unions’ ability to bid up the wages of those who with lower marginal productivity and 
those who may be earning below their marginal product as a result of discrimination or labor 
market segmentation.  The picture was very different when we estimated the US premium at the 
level of industry, state and occupation.  The premium went up in many indus tries and 
occupations, and down in others, but again there was regression to the mean. 
US analyses for the public sector revealed quite a different picture.  Here the premium 
rose a little and did so for all types of public sector worker.   
What are the implications for trade unions?  The size of the premium in the US might 
suggest that the benefits of membership, net of dues and other costs, remain sizeable.  So why 
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has density been declining in the private sector?  One possibility is that the premium comes at 
the cost of union jobs – evidence for the US and the UK shows unionized establishments grow at 
a slower rate than non-unionized establishments (Blanchflower, et al, 1991; Leonard, 1992; 
Bryson, 2004).  Unionized companies face greater competition from nonunion employers at a 
time when increasing price competitiveness means employers are less able to pass the costs of 
the premium onto the consumer.  Declining union density, by increasing employers’ 
opportunities to substitute nonunion products for union products, fueled this process.  So too did 
rising import penetration:  if imports are nonunion goods, regardless of US union density, they 
increase the opportunity for nonunion competition.  These pressures have increased the 
employment price of any union wage premium.  A second possibility – not inconsistent with the 
first – is that the costs of membership have risen, most notably through increasing employer 
opposition to union organizing (Kleiner, 2002).  That opposition may even be fuelled, in part, by 
the size of the wage premium if employers might view it as the price tag attached to successful 
union organizing campaigns.  Either way, it is clear that unions’ relative success in the 
bargaining arena is not going to bring about a reversal in union fortunes.  In the UK, the problem 
is that unions are struggling to procure any premium for members.  At a time when the new 
cohort of employers has turned away from unions (Bryson et al, 2004), raising the costs of 
employees joining unions, this dip in the premium means a further reduction in the net benefits 
of membership, making it increasingly difficult for unions to recruit new members.   
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Table 1.  Union Wage Gap Estimates for the United States, 1973-2002 (%) 
(excludes workers with imputed earnings) 
 All Sectors Private Sector  Private Sector  
Year Blanchflower/Bryson Blanchflower/Bryson Hirsh/Schumacher 
1973 14.1 12.7 17.5 
1974 14.6 13.8 17.5 
1975 15.1 14.3 19.2 
1976 15.5 14.6 20.4 
1977 19.0 18.3 23.9 
1978 18.8 18.6 22.8 
1979 16.6 16.3 19.7 
1980 17.7 17.0 21.3 
1981 16.1 16.3 20.4 
1983 19.5 21.2 25.5 
1984 20.4 22.4 26.2 
1985 19.2 21.0 26.0 
1986 18.8 20.1 23.9 
1987 18.5 20.0 24.0 
1988 18.4 19.1 22.6 
1989 17.8 19.2 24.5 
1990 17.1 17.6 22.5 
1991 16.1 16.6 22.0 
1992 17.9 19.2 22.5 
1993 18.5 19.6 23.5 
1994 18.5 18.2 25.2 
1995 17.4 18.0 24.5 
1996 17.4 18.4 23.5 
1997 17.4 17.7 23.2 
1998 15.8 16.1 22.4 
1999 16.0 16.9 22.0 
2000 13.4 14.3  20.4 
2001 14.1 15.1 20.0 
2002 16.5 18.6  
1973-2002 average 17.1 17.6 22.4 
Note:  See Data Appendix for details of sample and controls.   
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Table 2.  Private Sector Union/Nonunion Log Hourly Wage Differentials, 
1974-1979 and 1996-2001, in Percent 
 1974-1979 1996-2001 
Men 19 17 
Women 22 13 
   
Ages 16-24 32 19 
Ages 25-44 17 16 
Ages 45-54 13 14 
Ages >=55 19 16 
   
Northeast 14 11 
Central 20 15 
South 24 19 
West 23 22 
   
< High school 33 26 
High school 19 21 
College 1-3 years 17 15 
College >=4 years 4 3 
   
Whites 21 16 
Non-white 22 19 
   
Tenure 0-3 years 20 20 
Tenure 4-10 16 15 
Tenure 11-15 10 11 
Tenure 16+ 17 8 
   
Manual 30 21 
Non-manual 15 4 
   
Manufacturing 16 10 
Construction 49 39 
Services (excl.  construction) 34 16 
Private sector 21 17 
Note:  See Data Appendix for details of samples and controls. 
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Table 3.  Union Wage Differentials in the Public Sector, in Percent 
 1983-1988 1996-2001 
Private 22 17 
Public 13 15 
Federal  2 8 
State  9 10 
Local  16 20 
   
Male 8 10 
Female 17 16 
   
Age <25 28 23 
Age 25-44 13 15 
Age 45-54 8 11 
Age >=55 13 14 
   
New England 17 17 
Central 16 16 
South 10 12 
West 10 13 
   
<High School 26 18 
High School 15 13 
College 1-3 13 11 
College >= 4 Years 8 11 
   
Whites 13 14 
Non-whites 15 16 
   
Manual 18 18 
Non-manual 13 14 
Registered Nurses (95)  5 6 
Teachers (156-8) 15 21 
Social workers (174) 12 12 
Lawyers (178) 5 17 
Firefighters (416-7) 15 19 
Police & correction 
officers  (418-424) 16 18 
Notes:  sample excludes individuals with allocated earnings.  Controls and data as in Table 
2.   
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Table 4.  Industry, State, and Occupation Level Analysis of the Private Sector Union Wage Premium, 1983-2001 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Level of Analysis Industry Industry State State Occupation Occupation 
Premiumt-1 .2584* .3453* .2051* .2366* .0907* .1746* 
 (.0367) (.0350) (.0337) (.0333) (.0379) (.0374) 
Unemployment ratet-1 .6333 .5866* .4373* .5366* .3799 .5823* 
 (.4035) (.2821) (.1449) (.1175) (.5084) (.2900) 
Time -.0463 -.2344* -.1547* -.0651 -.3419* -.2416* 
 (.1056) (.0762) (.0468) (.0379) (.1343) (.0788) 
       
State/industry/occupation dummies 50 50 41 41 41 41 
Weighted by # obs at 1st stage No Yes No Yes No Yes 
       
R2 .6187 .7749 .5071 .5861 .7345 .8453 
N 756 756 918 918 756 756 
Source:  Outgoing Rotation Groups of the CPS, 1984-2001.  Samples exclude individuals with imputed earnings.  Standard errors 
in parentheses. 
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Table 5.  Industry Level Analysis of the Union Wage Premium in the Private Sector, 1973-1999 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Premiumt-1     .6030* .2759* .6001* .2468* .3196* 
     (.0274) (.0350) (.0284) (.0361) (.0333) 
Time    -.0019* -.0012* .0002 -.0011* -.0001 -.0009* 
    (.0004) (.0003) (.0004) (.0003) (.0004) (.0003) 
Unemployment rate .0187* .0131* .0108* .0083* .0064* .0064* .0061* .0070* .0052* 
 (.0017) (.0017) (.0011) (.0014) (.0010) (.0021) (.0011) (.0022) (.0010) 
COLA .0763* .0767* .0403* .0155 -.0065 .0139 .0041 .0156 .0141* 
 (.0313) (.0303) (.0126) (.0134) (.0090) (.0140) (.0108) (.0144) (.0096) 
Inflation -.0182* -.0077 .0012 .0006 .0024* .0026 .0020* .0032 .0002 
 (.0065) (.0069) (.0008) (.0008) (.0007) (.0015) (.0008) (.0016) (.0008) 
Unempt rate*COLA -.0092* -.0047        
 (.0038) (.0036)        
Unempt rate*Inflation .0026* .0012        
 (.0009) (.0009)        
Import penetration .2048* .2201* .2362* .3090* .1688* .1234* .1738* .1668* .1811* 
  Durables (.0427) (.0414) (.0441) (.0424) (.0326) (.0416) (.0461) (.0549) (.0302) 
Import penetration .1655* .1459* .1491* .1698* .0939* .0880* .0914* .0945* .1043* 
  Non-durables (.0513) (.0525) (.0509) (.0488 ) (.0302) (.0208) (.0419) (.0265) (.0314) 
Dereg.Communications .0752* .0609* .0589* .0612* .0451* .0625* .0506* .0734* .0532* 
 (.0316) (.0244) (.0246) (.0248) (.0200) (.0307) (.0234) (.0261) (.0193) 
Deregulation Rail .0329 .0400 .0394 .0580 .0200    .0333 
 (.0905) (.0844) (.0855) (.0839) (.0616)    (.0606) 
Deregulation Trucking -.0716 -.0617 -.0630 -.0394 -.0139    -.0332 
 (.0560) (.0570) (.0565) (.0518) (.0429)    (.0398) 
Deregulation Air .0554 .0684 .0661 .0815 .0087    .0214 
 (.1262) (.1217) (.1190) (.1161) (.0852)    (.0804) 
Deregulation Finance -.0614* -.0599* -.0587* -.0329 .0179    -.0174 
 (.0191) (.0188) (.0195) (.0203) (.0160)    (.0150) 
Weighted .Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes No Yes 
Method GLS GLS GLS GLS GLS GLS OLS OLS GLS 
Wald Chi2/ R2 2325.01 2781.32 2686.37 3190.74 10961.71 1220.21 .8973 .6516 6189.4 
N 832 832 832 832 832 832 832 832 806 
Notes:  all equations also include a full set of 31 industry dummies.  Data are taken from Bratsberg and Ragan 2002.  GLS regression estimated with 
industry specific AR(1) process in error term.  Where indicated ach observation in the GLS regressions is weighted by the industry observation count of the 
first step following Bratsberg and Ragan (2002).  Column 9 excludes Retail Trade.  Standard errors in parentheses. 
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Table 6.  Time-Series Estimates of Union Wage Premium (%), UK and Britain 
 
 LFS BSA 
1985  3.5 
1986  11.1 
1987  7.9 
1989  6.3 
1990  6.3 
1991  4.8 
1993 14.9 11.4 
1994 17.5 13.7 
1995 14.6 13.1 
1996 14.8 7.3 
1997 11.4 17.7 
1998 12.2 11.0 
1999 10.2 9.5 
2000 10.3 5.0 
2001  4.4 
2002  6.4 
Note:  See Data Appendix for samples and controls used.   
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Table 7.  Estimated coefficients on union membership dummy from 
hourly pay equations 
 Individual Individual + workplace 
Whole private sector .140* .059* 
Covered occupations .125* .065* 
Men .165* .060* 
Women .098* .061* 
Manual .204* .075* 
Non-manual .055* .019 
Note:  * = significant at 95% confidence interval or above .  Details of estimation 
procedure, controls, samples and diagnostics are contained in the Data Appendix 
 
 27 
 
Table 8.  Mean percentage hourly wage premium for union members using 
propensity score matching 
 Individual Individual + workplace 
Whole private sector 8.9*  -1.5 
Covered occupations 2.8*  -1.0 
Men 11.1*  2.1 
Women 1.3  -3.3  
Manual 17.7* 6.9 
Non-manual 3.6 -1.0 
Note:  * = significant at 95% confidence interval or above .  Details of estimation 
procedure, controls, samples and diagnostics are contained in the Data Appendix 
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Table 9.  Sensitivity analyses  
 OLS, unmatched 
data 
PSM OLS, matched data 
1.  Original estimates for whole 
private sector 
6.1* -1.5 5.1* 
2.  Exclude union recognition and 
union density from workplace 
variables 
 
11.7* 
 
1.8 
 
8.6* 
3.  Add workplace training and 
workplace tenure to individual 
variables 
4.8* 
 
-1.5% 
 
5.7* 
4.  Change dependent variable to 
log gross weekly wages 
7.8* -2.5% 5.4* 
5a.  Employees in workplaces 
with 50%+ union density 
8.9* 2.6 4.7 
5b.  Employees in workplaces 
with <50% union density 
5.0* -1.9% 4.9%* 
Note:  Figures are percentage differentials based on exponentiated differences in log wages 
between members and non-members.  * = significant at 95% confidence interval or above.  
Details of estimation procedure, controls, samples and diagnostics are contained in the Data 
Appendix 
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Figure 1:  Movement in the US union membership wage premium, 1973-2002 
 
 
3
7
11
15
19
23
73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02
Unemployment Whole  economy Private sector
 30 
Figure 2:  Movements in the UK/British Union Membership Wage Premium, 1985-2002 
 
 
 
Note:  Unemployment using ILO definition.  BSAS figures are unweighted mid-point estimates using banded earnings data. 
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
16
18
20
1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002
BSAS UK LFS UK unemployment
 31 
References 
 
Abowd, J. M., Kramarz, F. and Margolis, D. N. (1999), ‘High Wage Workers and High Wage 
Firms ’, Econometrica, 67, March:  pp. 251-333. 
 
Andrews, M. J., Stewart, M. B., Swaffield, J. K. and Upward, R. (1998), ‘The Estimation of 
Union Wage Differentials and the Impact of Methodological Choices’, Labour 
Economics , 5 (4), pp. 449-474. 
 
Blanchflower, D. G. (1999), ‘Changes Over Time in Union Relative Wage Effects in Great 
Britain and the United States’, in S. Daniel, P. Arestis, and J. Grahl (eds.), The History 
and Practice of Economics:  Essays in Honour of Bernard Corry and Maurice Peston, 
Volume. 2, Northampton, Mass.:  Edward Elgar, pp. 3-32. 
 
Blanchflower, D. and Bryson, A. (2003a), ‘Cha nges Over Time in Union Relative Wage Effects 
in the UK and the US Revisited’, Chapter 7 in International Handbook of Trade Unions, 
John T. Addison and Claus Schnabel (eds.), Cheltenham England and Northampton 
Mass., USA:  Edward Elgar. 
 
Blanchflower, D. and Bryson, A. (2004), ‘What Effect Do Unions Have on Wages Now and 
Would “What Do Unions Do?” be Surprised?’, Journal of Labor Research, forthcoming. 
 
Blanchflower, D. G., Millward, N. and Oswald, A. J. (1991), ‘Unionism and Employment 
Behaviour’, The Economic Journal, 101, pp. 815-834. 
 
Blanchflower, D. G., Oswald, A. J. and Sanfey, P. (1996), ‘Wages, Profits and Rent Sharing’, 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 111 (1), pp. 227-251. 
 
Booth, A. L. (1995), The Economics of the Trade Union, Cambridge University Press, England. 
 
Booth, A. L., and Bryan, M. L. (2004), ‘The Union Membership Wage-Premium Puzzle :  Is 
There a Free Rider Problem?’, Industrial and Labor Relations Review, forthcoming. 
 
Brown, W., S. Deakin, M. Hudson, C. Pratten, and P. Ryan (1998), The Individualisation of 
Employment Contracts in Britain’, Employment Relations Research Series 4, London:  
Department of Trade and Industry. 
 
Bratsberg, B., and J. F. Ragan (2002), ‘Changes in the Union Wage Premium by Industry – Data 
and Analysis’, Industrial and Labor Relations Review, 56 (1) October. 
 
Bryson, A. (2004) , ‘Unions and Employment Growth in British Workplaces During the 1990s :  
A Panel Analysis’, Scottish Journal of Political Economy, forthcoming 
 
Bryson, A. (2002) The Size of the Union Membership Wage Premium in Britain’s Private Sector, 
PSI Discussion Paper No. 9, PSI Report No. 886 (http://www.psi.org.uk) 
 32 
Bryson, A., Gomez, R. and Willman, P. (2004) , ‘The End of the Affair?  The Decline in 
Employers’ Propensity to Unionize’, in J. Kelly and P. Willman (eds.), Union 
Organization and Activity, London:  Routledge, forthcoming. 
 
Budd, J. W. and Na, I-G. (2000), ‘The Union Membership Wage Premium for Employees 
Covered by Collective Bargaining Agreements’, Journal of Labor Economics, 18 (4), 
 pp. 783-807. 
 
Farber, H. S. (2003) , ‘Nonunion Wage Rates and the Threat of Unionization’, NBER Working 
Paper #9705. 
 
Forth, J., and Millward, N. (2000a), ‘Pay Settlements in Britain’, NIESR Discussion Paper 
No.173, London:  National Institute for Social and Economic Research.  
 
Forth, J. and Millward, N. (2002b), ‘Union Effects on Pay Levels in Britain’, Labour Economics, 
9 (2002):  pp. 547-561. 
 
Freeman, R. B. and Medoff, J. (1984), What Do Unions Do?, New York:  Basic Books. 
 
Grant, D. (2001), ‘A Comparison of the Cyclical Behavior of Union and Nonunion Wages in the 
United States’, Journal of Human Resources, 36 (1), pp. 31-57. 
 
Heckman, J., Ichimura, H., Smith, J. and Todd, P. (1998) , ‘Characterizing Selection Bias Using 
Experimental Data’, Econometrica, 66:  pp. 1017-1098. 
 
Heckman, J., LaLonde, R. and Smith, J. (1999) , ‘The Economics and Econometrics of Active 
Labor Market Programs’, in O. Ashenfelter and D. Card (eds.), The Handbook of Labour 
Economics , Vol. III, Amsterdam:  North Holland. 
 
Hildreth, A. K. G. (1999), ‘What Has Happened to the Union Wage Differential in Britain in the 
1990s?’, Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, 61 (1), pp. 5-31. 
 
Hildreth, A. K. G. (2000), ‘Union Wage Differentials for Covered Members and Non-Members 
in Great Britain’, Journal of Labor Research, 21 (1), pp. 133-147. 
 
Hirsch, B. T. and Macpherson, D. A. (2002), Union Membership and Earnings Data Book:  
Compilations from the Current Population Survey (2002 Edition), Washington:  Bureau 
of National Affairs. 
 
Hirsch, B. T., Macpherson, D. A. and Schumacher , E. J. (2002), ‘Measuring Union and Non-
Union Wage Growth:  Puzzles in Search of Solutions’, paper presented at the 23rd 
Middlebury Economics Conference, Changing Role of Unions , Middlebury, Vermont, 
April. 
 
 
 33 
Hirsch, B. T. and Schumacher, E. J. (2002), ‘Match Bias In Wage Gap Estimates Due To 
Earnings Imputation’, Mimeograph, Trinity University, available at 
 www.trinity.edu/bhirsch/ or www.ssrn.com. 
 
Kleiner, M. (2002) ‘Intensity of Management Resistance:  Understanding the Decline of 
Unionization in the Private Sector’, in James T. Bennett and Bruce E. Kaufman (eds.), 
The Future of Private Sector Unionism in the United States, Armonk, N.Y.:  M.E. 
Sharpe, pp. 292-316 
 
Lanot, G. and Walker, I. (1998), ‘The Union/Non-Union Wage Differential:  An Application of 
Semi-Parametric Methods’, Journal of Econometrics, 84 (2), pp. 327-349. 
 
Lawrence, C. and Lawrence, R. Z. (1985) , ‘Manufacturing Wage Dispersion:  An End Game 
Interpretation’, Brookings Papers on Economic Activity 0 (1):  pp. 47-116. 
 
Lewis, H. G. (1986), Union Relative Wage Effects:  A Survey, Chicago, Ill.:  University of 
Chicago Press. 
 
Leonard, J. S. (1992) , ‘Unions and Employment Growth’, Industrial Relations 31:  pp. 80-94. 
 
Machin, S. (2001), ‘Does It Still Pay To Be In Or To Join A Union?’, Working Paper, University 
College London. 
 
Metcalf, D., Hansen, K. and Charlwood, A. (2001), ‘Unions and the Sword of Justice :  Unions 
and Pay Systems, Pay Inequality, Pay Discrimination and Low Pay’, National Institute 
Economic Review, 176, pp. 61-75. 
 
Millward, N., Forth, J. and Bryson, A. (2001), Who Calls the Tune at Work? The Impact of 
Unions on Jobs and Pay, York:  Joseph Rowntree Foundation. 
 
Moore, W. J., and Raisian, J. (1980), ‘Cyclical Sensitivity of Union/Non-Union Relative Wage 
Effects’, Journal of Labor Research, 1 (1), pp. 115-132. 
 
Rosenbaum, P. and Rubin, D. (1983) , ‘The central role of the propensity score in observational 
studies for causal effects’ , Biometrica, 70:  pp. 41-50. 
 
Schumacher, E. J. (1999), ‘What Explains Wage Differences between Union Members and 
Covered Non-Members?’, Southern Economic Journal, 65 (3), pp. 493-512. 
 
Shah, A. (1984), ‘Job Attributes and the Size of the Union/Non-Union Wage Differential’, 
Economica , 51 (204), pp. 437-446. 
 
Staiger, R. W. ‘Organized Labor and the Scope of International Specialization’, Journal of 
Political Economy, 96 (October 1988) :  pp. 1022-1047. 
 
 
 34 
Stewart, M. B. (1987), ‘Collective Bargaining Arrangements, Closed Shops and Relative Pay’, 
Economic Journal, 97 (385), pp. 140-156. 
 
Stewart, M. B. (1995), ‘Union Wage Differentials in an Era of Declining Unionization’, Oxford 
Bulletin of Economics and Statistics , 57 (2), pp. 143-166. 
 
Wunnava, P. V., and Okunade, A. A. (1996), ‘Countercyclical Union Wage Premium?  Evidence 
for the 1980s’, Journal of Labor Research, 17 (2), pp. 289-296.  
 
CENTRE FOR ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE 
Recent Discussion Papers  
 
611 Stephen Gibbons 
Stephen Machin 
Valuing Rail Access Using Transport Innovation 
   
610 Johannes Hörner 
L.Rachel Ngai 
Claudia Olivetti 
Public Enterprises and Labor Market Performance 
   
609 Nikolaus Wolf Endowments, Market Potential, and Industrial 
Location:  Evidence from Interwar Poland 
(1918-1939) 
   
608 Ellen E. Meade 
David Stasavage 
Publicity of Debate and the Incentive to Dissent:  
Evidence from the US Federal Reserve 
   
607 Ghazala Azmat 
Maia Güell 
Alan Manning 
Gender Gaps in Unemployment Rates in OECD 
Countries 
   
606 Henry G. Overman 
L. Alan Winters 
The Geography of UK International Trade 
   
605 Stephen Machin 
Stephen Wood 
Looking for HRM/Union Substitution:  Evidence 
from British Workplaces 
   
604 Maarten Goos 
Alan Manning 
Lousy and Lovely Jobs:  the Rising Polarization of 
Work in Britain 
   
603 Nan-Kuang Chen 
Hsiao-Lei Chu 
Collateral Value and Forbearance Lending 
   
602 Ricardo Peccei 
Helen Bewley 
Howard Gospel 
Paul Willman 
Is it Good To Talk?  Information Disclosure and 
Organisational Performance in the UK 
Incorporating evidence submitted on the DTI 
discussion paper ‘High Performance Workplaces – 
Informing and Consulting Employees’ 
   
601 Andy Charlwood The Anatomy of Union Decline in Britain 
1990-1998 
   
600 Christopher A. Pissarides Unemployment in Britain:  A European Success Story 
   
599 Stephen Bond 
Dietmar Harhoff 
John Van Reenen 
Corporate R&D and Productivity in Germany and the 
United Kingdom 
   
598 Michael Storper 
Anthony J. Venables 
Buzz:  Face-to-Face Contact and the Urban Economy 
   
597 Stephen Gibbons 
Alan Manning 
The Incidence of UK Housing Benefit:  Evidence 
from the 1990s Reforms 
   
596 Paul Gregg 
Maria Gutiérrez-
Domènech 
Jane Waldfogel 
The Employment of Married Mothers in Great 
Britain:  1974-2000 
   
595 Stephen Bond 
Dietmar Harhoff 
John Van Reenen 
Investment, R&D and Financial Constraints in Britain 
and Germany 
   
594 Andrew B. Bernard 
Stephen Redding 
Peter K. Schott 
Product Choice and Product Switching 
   
593 Anthony J. Venables Spatial Disparities in Developing Countries:  Cities, 
Regions and International Trade 
   
592 Sylvie Charlot 
Gilles Duranton 
Communication Externalities in Cities 
   
591 Paul Willman 
Alex Bryson 
Rafael Gomez 
Why Do Voice Regimes Differ? 
   
590 Marco Manacorda Child Labor and the Labor Supply of Other 
Household Members:  Evidence from 1920 America 
   
589 Alex Bryson 
Rafael Gomez 
Why Have Workers Stopped Joining Unions? 
   
588 Henry G. Overman 
L. Alan Winters 
Trade Shocks and Industrial Location:  the Impact of 
EEC Accession on the UK 
 
The Centre for Economic Performance Publications Unit 
Tel  020 7955 7673     Fax  020 7955 7595     Email  info@cep.lse.ac.uk 
Web site  http://cep.lse.ac.uk 
